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Introduction

The Future of Environmental
Regulation After Article 1 1 10
of NAFTA:
A Look at the Methanex and
Metalclad Cases
By Marisa Yee&

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect on January 1,
1994.1 NAFTA is a trade agreement between
the United States, Mexico and Canada. Its
goals include eliminating trade barriers,
resolving disputes, promoting fair competition, and increasing investment opportunities
throughout the three countries. 2 Chapter 11
of NAFTA governs the treatment and protection of foreign investments made within the
territory of NAFTA co-signers. Article 1110 of
Chapter 11 is a key provision that prohibits
host parties from expropriating (directly or indirectly) investments made by private investors within their territory.3 Furthermore,
Article 1110 provides that in the event of an
expropriation occurring, compensation shall
4
be provided to the injured party.
Unfortunately, the term "expropriation"
within Article 1110 remains unclear. This ambiguity leaves governments vulnerable to lawsuits by foreign companies that conduct
business in the host country whenever the
host country's actions reduce the companies'
profits. This may jeopardize many national
regulations, including efforts to protect the
environment. Furthermore, Article 1110 gives
foreign investors the right to sue host governments while offering no such protection to
domestic investors. Thus, the foreign investors gain an unfair advantage over domestic
companies.
According to a November 1999 report by
the Ministry of Employment & Investment of
SJ.D., University of California, Hastings College of the
Law, 2003. Associate attorney in the Concrod, California
office of Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman. The author
wishes to thank professor Brian Gray and the 2002-03 WestNorthwest Editorial Board, particularly Editor-in-Chief Mike
Lynes and Senior Articles Editor Conor Massey.
1. Office of NAFTA and Inter-American Affairs (March
2002), available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/ovrview.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
2. See generally North American Free Trade Agreement.
Dec. 8, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
3. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1110.
4. Id.
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British Columbia, "The most controversial
part of NAFTA is the investor-state provision
whereby a private investor can sue a state
over an alleged breach of the agreement to
obtain mandatory compensation, even if the
action is for a public purpose such as protecting the environment."5 This paper examines
the future of environmental regulation after
the implementation of Article 1110 of NAFTA.
Specifically, this paper will explore the potential for passing future environmental regulation in host countries amid threats of
potential lawsuits brought by private corporations claiming expropriation of their investments. In discussing this problem, this paper
will analyze two recent cases, Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States6 and Methanex Cor7
poration v. United States of America.

Part I of this paper will introduce NAFTA,
specifically Article 1110 and the difficulties
that have arisen in defining "expropriation."
Part 11of this paper will examine the background of the Methanex case, provide the pertinent facts, and discuss its current state of
arbitration. Part III will give the background
of the Metalclad arbitration, including the ultimate award that was decided by the Tribunal.
Part IVwill analyze the potential environmental effects that may result from the rulings in
Metalclad and (potentially) Methanex. Part V

will examine the potentially unfair advantage
foreign corporations gain over domestic corporations through NAFTA's expropriation
protections.

I. NAFTA - Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a comprehensive trade
agreement between Canada, the United
States, and Mexico that was created to improve business transactions within North
America. NAFTA eliminated all tariffs between the U.S. and Canada by 1998,8 and will
eliminate almost all of the tariffs between the
U.S. and Mexico by 2008. The Agreement
also removes other barriers that have excluded U.S. goods from the other two markets, especially Mexico.
Since NAFTA's
passage, the United States' economy has
boomed and NAFTA has helped create fair
and open markets within the NAFTA countries. 9
NAFTA establishes concrete rules for settling disputes. Chapter 11 deals with investment disputes relating to obligations of
NAFTA parties. 10 Under Chapter 11, NAFTA
lists dispute resolution procedures to resolve
complaints between the investor and the host
country. Complaints brought under Chapter
II are resolved by arbitration, based on the
arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
A. NAFTA: Chapter I I
This article primarily discusses Part Five
of NAFTA, Chapter 11: Investment Services
and Related Matters. " However, the analysis
will focus on Article 1110 and the potential
for abuse by private investors.

5. Gerard Greenfield, The Ties That Bind: A Brief Note on
NAFTA Chapter I l-Type Rules in Canada's Bilateral Agreements,
available at http://www.wtoaction.org/greenfield4.phtmI (last
visited Oct. 15, 2002).

10. Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Dispute Settlement Under the NAFTA, available at http://
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/settle-e.asp (last visited
Oct. 15, 2002).

6. For a list of the NAFTA claim documents on Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, visit http://www.nafta
claims.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).

11. The relevant Articles of Chapter 11 for the purposes of this paper are: Articles 1101 (Scope and Coverage), Article 1102 (National Treatment), 1105 (Minimum
Standard of Treatment), I110 (Expropriation and Compensation), and 1116 (Claim by an Investor of a Party on its
Own Behalf).

7. For a list of the NAFTA claim documents on
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, visit http://
www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
8. Office of NAF'A and Inter-American Affairs, supra

note 1.
9. United States Trade Representative/World Regions,
NAFTA Overview, available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/
whemisphere/overview.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2003).
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Chapter I I of NAFTA is designed to protect investors from government expropriation
by ensuring compensation. 12 Theoretically,
Chapter 11 of NAFTA provides more security
to foreign investors, which induces them to
invest and stimulate economic growth; as a
result, NAFTA countries are more likely to see
expanded development. 13 Attracting investment is an important goal for Mexico, and
many view the inclusion of Chapter 11 in
NAFTA as crucial for expanding direct foreign
investment in Mexico.' 4 Canada and the
United States also appreciated Chapter 11
because it protect their citizens who invest
in Mexico.' 5 Thus, at least in theory, Chapter
11 seemed to benefit all of the parties involved in the treaty.

claims cannot be filed within six months of
the occurrence of the events giving rise to the
claim. Under Article 1121, the disputing investor must waive the right to initiate litigation under any other administrative tribunal
as a condition for submission under Article

This investor-state component of NAFTA
differs from other dispute resolution systems
because Chapter 11 allows individuals and
6
corporations to sue national governments.'
Corporations are permitted to sue governments in front of secret arbitration panels if
they believe that a regulation or governmental decision by the host country has infringed
on their investment in relation to the rules
established by NAFTA. 17 If the corporation
wins the lawsuit, then the taxpayers of the
defendant country must pay damages.' 8

ticipation or observation.

Claims brought by investors under Chapter 11 may vary, but assertions against national governments are limited. Claims must
be filed within three years from the date the
investor acquired knowledge of the alleged
breach and with knowledge that the investor
has incurred a damage or loss. 19 However,
12. Daniel R. Loritz, Comment, Corporate Predators Attack Environmental Regulations: It's Time to Arbitrate Claims Filed

Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 22 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
533, 539 (2000).
13. Howard Mann, NAFTA and the Environment: Lessons
for the Future, 13 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 387, 402 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Loritz, supra note 12, at 539.
17. Protecting Health, Safety and Democracy, National Non-Profit Public Interest Organization. NAFTA
Chapter 11: Corporate Cases, at http://www.citizen org/trade/
nafta/CHIll/articles.cfm?ID=6475 (last visited Apr. 12,
2003).

18. Id.

1116.20

Claims brought under Chapter 11 are litigated before the special international arbitration bodies of the United Nations and the
World Bank. 2 1 The panel consists of three
professional arbitrators, who have the authority to award unlimited damages to the plaintiffs if the panel rules that the defendant
violated the investor's privileges and rights.
These arbitration proceedings are negotiated
behind closed doors and prohibit public par22

B. NAFTA and The Free Trade Agenda.
The term "free trade agenda" describes
the trend towards the removal of restrictions,
barriers, and obstacles, to what should be
"free trade" between nations.

23

Barriers in-

clude governmental regulation of corporate
activities, such as laws that regulate the environment, employment, and public health. It
also involves governmental regulation where
private industry is excluded, such as in public
sector services and utilities. According to
some, these barriers reduce the potential for
24
corporate profit.

Over the last decade, the notion of "regulatory expropriation" has become an impor19. Lucien 1. Dhooge, The Revenge of the Trail Smelter: Environmental Regulation as Expropriation Pursuant to the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 38 AM . Bus. L.J. 475, 489

(2001).
20. Id.
21. Protecting Health, Safety and Democracy, supra,
note 17
22. Id.
23. The premise behind this agenda is to allow multinationals greater access to new markets free from any restrictions. For more information, visit http://pilger.carlton.
com/globalisation/liberalisation (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
24. WTOAction.Org: The NAFTA Ruling on Metalclad v.
Mexico, Sept. 2000, at http://www.wtoaction.org/greenfield2.
phtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
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tant part of the "free trade agenda." 25 The

doctrine of "regulatory expropriation" evolved
.out of law professor Richard Epstein's theory
of "regulatory takings," 26 first articulated in

Epstein's book, Takings: Private Property and the

27
Power of Eminent Domain in the mid 1980s.

Epstein introduced a new constitutional interpretation that was designed to reign in
modern government. Epstein argued that
regulations that affect private parties' profits
should be understood as "takings" under the
Fifth Amendment and that governments must
compensate businesses or individuals when
their property value is diminished by public
actions.

28

C. Article

110 of NAFTA.

Article 11 10 (Expropriation and Compensation) states:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of
an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such
an investment ("expropriation"), except:
a. For a public purpose;
b. On a non-discriminatory basis;
c. In accordance with due process of law
and Article 1105(1); and
d. On payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 6.29
Attempts to distinguish between "direct"
and "indirect" expropriation have been difficult. Through an indirect expropriation, the
property owner generally does not relinquish
title to his or her property.3 0 Therefore, an indirect expropriation describes a situation in
which a foreign property owner has suffered a
25. William Grieder, The Right and U.S. Trade Law: InvaliNATION, Oct. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.thenation.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).

dating the 20th Century, THE
26. Id.
27- Id.
28. Id.

29. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1110.
30. Jason L. Gudofsky, Shedding Light on Article 1110 of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations: An Environmental Case Study, 21 Nw. J. Int'l L. &
Bus. 243, 257 (2000).
31. Id. at 258.

significant loss over the use of the enjoyment
of his or her property but has not relin31
quished title to the land.
"Expropriation" may be defined by exploring international law definitions, as well
as traditional U.S., Canadian, and Mexican interpretations of the term. International law
defines "expropriation" as "a compulsory
transfer of property rights." 32 NAFTA's defini-

tion encompasses traditional U.S. and Canadian definitions.

33

Canada follows the Expropriations Act, a
remedial statute under which an expropriation occurs when a statutory authority acquires part of an owner's land without the
owner's consent, and there is a reduction of
market value to the remaining land.3 4 The
Act applies when land is expropriated or inju35
riously affected by a statutory authority.
The owner receives compensation based on
the market value of the land, damages attributable to the disturbance, damages for injurious affection, and any special difficulties that
36
may arise in relocation.
The United States' definition of "expropriation" originates from bilateral investment
treaties. 37 Bilateral investment treaties were
developed to protect U.S. national investments in developing countries. Although the
treaties do not clearly define "expropriation",
the definition includes individual acts of expropriation and broader acts designed to
restructure a particular industry or a whole
economy. 38 This definition includes indirect
takings through means of oppressive taxation
39
and management restrictions.

Traditional U.S. law defines "expropriation" as the taking of private property (gener32. Loritz, supra note 12, at 540.
33. Dhooge, supra note 19, at 519.
34. Expropriations Act, R.S.O., ch. E26 (1990) (Can.),
available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Statutes/
English/90e26_e.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Dhooge, supra note 19, at 520.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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ally land) by the government. 40

Under the

U.S. Constitution, if the government passes a
law which deprives the land owner of the use
and enjoyment of his property, then the government must compensate that land owner
for his loss. 4'

For example, in Lucas v. South

Carolina Coastal Council, the United States Supreme Court held that the state of South Carolina had to compensate a landowner who
was barred from building homes on his private land due to the passage of South Caro42
lina's Beachfront Management Act.

Examining Mexican law also illuminates
the definition of "expropriation." In the Metalclad decision, the Tribunal defined "expropriation" to include "incidental interference with
the use of property," which is a more expansive view that awards compensation even if
an investor is only partially deprived of the
economic use of the property. 43 The Tribunal
stated that an expropriation includes open
takings of property, as well as incidental interference with the use of property, which deprives the owner, in whole or in significant
part, of "the use or reasonably to be expected
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State.

44

NAFTA

defines

expropriation

more

broadly than U.S. or Mexican law. 45 There are

three important aspects of the expanded definition:
1. In addition to land and physical assets,
private property refers to the market- determined commercial value of property, including a corporation's asset value and
future profit earnings.
2. Under the new definition, compensation is
awarded when any part of commercial
40. WTOAction.Org: The NAFTA Ruling on Metalclad v.
Mexico, supra note 24.
41. U.S. CONST. amendV.
42. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992).

value is lost. Traditionally, compensation
was awarded only when the entire value of
property was lost.
3. In addition to "expropriation," acts "tantamount to expropriation" also require compensation. This includes a range of
government policies, laws and administrative acts which may be viewed as having a
46
similar effect as expropriation.
This expanded definition of expropriation sets the stage for many of the cases
brought under Chapter 11 of NAFA, including the two to be examined in this note.
!1. Methanex Corporation v. United States of
America
Many criticize Methanex Corporation v.
United States of America because of the potentially serious adverse effects on national environmental protection laws. 4 7 Critics claim
that the arbitration procedures are undemocratic, particularly because they are carried
out in secret, and that the public is denied its
right to clean water and air without being
given a say in the matter. 48 Methanex is currently in arbitration in Washington D.C. 4 9 Its
outcome may have important environmental
implications and will affect future litigation
under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
A. MTBE.
Methanol, commonly referred to as
"wood alcohol," is the simplest alcohol. 50
Methanol is manufactured from fossil fuels
such as coal and natural gas, as well as from
45. WTOAction.Org: The NAFTA Ruling on Metalclad v.
Mexico, supra note 24.
46. Id.
47. Dhooge, supra note 19, at 478.
48. Id. at 479.

43. Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, The "Metalclad" Decision under NAFTA's Chapter 11, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 27,
2000, available at http://www.clm.com/pubs/pub-990359-1.
html.

49. The Written Reasons for the Tribunal's Decision of
7th September 2000 on the Place of Arbitration, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).

44. See Final Award, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican
States, p. 33, Sept. 2, 2000, available at http://www.nafta
claims.com [hereinafter Final Award].

50. Methanol Basics- What is Methanol? Fact Sheet
OMS-7, Aug. 1994, available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/07meoh.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).

89
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biomass (such as wood). 5 Methyl tertiarybutyl ether (MTBE) is a derivative of methanol and is used almost exclusively as a fuel
additive in gasoline. 5 2 MTBE is used as a
gasoline additive because it is a source of octane, which helps fuel resist uncontrollable
combustion. MTBE is the most commonly
used fuel oxygenate.

53

MTBE has been used in U.S. gasoline
since 1979. 54 In 1990, the United States
passed amendments to the Clean Air Act that
required increased oxygen content in gasoline for certain regions of the United States,
including California. 55

Under the Amend-

ments, oxygenates were required to be added
to gasoline in order to reduce harmful emissions in automobile exhaust. Therefore,
since 1992, MTBE has been used at higher
concentrations in order to meet the require56
ments of the Clean Air Act Amendments.
MTBE has been the preferred fuel oxygenate because of its low cost, ease of production, and favorable transfer and blending
characteristics. 57 However, the chemical has

a bitter, turpentine-like taste and odor, and
even at very low concentrations can make
drinking water unpotable. 58

MTBE is highly

soluble in water, which indicates that it can
quickly contaminate groundwater reservoirs. 59 It is also more difficult and expensive

to clean up than other components and additives of gasoline.

60

Some of the symptoms of prolonged exposure to MTBE include headaches, eye irritation, burning of the nose and throat, and
nausea. 6' Laboratory studies have shown
that prolonged exposure to significant
amounts of MTBE in the air causes kidney
damage and can harm the developing fetus of
animals. 62 Studies also reveal that lifetime
exposure to MTBE in air causes cancer in lab63
oratory animals.
Gasoline leaks present a significant
threat to our environment, and because of
the chemical properties of MTBE, the drinking water supplies of California are
threatened. Both California and the federal
government have implemented programs to
minimize the occurrences of potential leaks
and spills of gasoline. However, given the
prevalence of gasoline and the limitations of
fuel storage and transportation, fuel leakages
are inevitable.
In the mid-1990s, some California residents began to notice a bitter taste and turpentine-like smell in their drinking water.
This contamination appeared in 30 public
water systems, including Santa Monica, Lake
Tahoe, and Shasta Lake, as well as 3500
groundwater sites.6 4 The source of the con-

tamination was traced to MTBE used in gasoline, which was leaking from storage tanks
into groundwater, thus rendering the water
undrinkable.65
at http://www.epa.gov/mtbe/water.htm#concerns

(last vis-

51. Id.
ited Nov. 12, 2002).
52. Id.
59. Id.
53. Id.
54. EPA: Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), June 22,
2001, availableat http://www.epa.gov/mtbe/gas.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
55. EPA: The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air
Act, available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/peg-caa/pegcaa02.html#topic2 (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
56. Id.
57. Paul J. Squillace, James F. Pankow, Nic E. Korte &
John S. Zogorski, Environmental Behavior and Fate of Methyl TertButyl Ether (MTBE), U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet, FS203-96, 1996, available at http://wwwsd.cr.usgs.gov/nawqa/
pubs/factsheet/fs20398.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
58. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), Drinking Water, available

60. id.
61. Assessment of Potential Health Risks of Gasoline Oxygenates with Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), Office of Research
and Development, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, available at
(last
http://www.epa.gov/ncea/oxygenates/gas-mtbe.htm
visited Oct. 15, 2002).
62. Office of Pollution and Prevention Toxics, U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency, Chemicals in the Environment: Methyl
Tert-Butyl Ether (CAS No. 1634-04-4), Aug. 1994, available at
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/chemfact/fmtbe.txt (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
63. Id.
64. Grieder, supra note 25.
65. Id.
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B. The UC Report on the Effects of MTBE
in November 1998, the University of California issued a report entitled Health and Environmental Assessment of MTBE: Report to
the Governor and Legislature of the State of
California as Sponsored by SB 521 (UC Report). 66 The multi-volume report on MTBE
followed the passage of SB 521, which
granted the University of California $500,000
to perform an extensive study on the human
health effects and environmental impacts of
67
using MTBE as an additive in gasoline.
The UC Report concluded that there are
significant costs and risks resulting from the
MTBE contamination of surface water and
groundwater. It stated that the cost to California for treatment of MTBE-contaminated
drinking water could be enormous. The UC
Report also found that MTBE is a carcinogen
to animals and possibly to humans, and concluded that there is "no significant additional
air quality benefit to the use of oxygenates
'6 8
such as MTBE in reformulated gasoline."
Recommendations were provided suggesting
that California should phase-out MTBE over a
several year interval instead of implementing
an immediate ban on MTBE.
C. The Executive Order to Phase Out
MTBE
On March 25, 1999, Governor Gray Davis
issued Executive Order D-5-99, which called
for a phase-out of MTBE in California gasoline by December 31, 2002.69 The Order declared that "on balance, there is significant
risk to the environment from using Methyl
70
Tertiary-Butyl Ether (MTBE) in gasoline."
The determination of the Executive Order was
66. University of California, Office of the President,
News Media Advisory Subject: UC Delivers Report on MTBE to
Governor Wilson, available at http://www.ucop.edu/news/
archives/1998/mtbe.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
67. UC [University of California] MTBE Fact Sheet,
Nov. 12, 1998, available at http://www.tsrtp.ucdavis.edu (last
visited Oct. 15, 2002).
68. Id.
69. Cal. Envtl. Protection Agency, Eleven Tasks of the
Executive Order, available at http://www.calepa.ca.gov/pro
grams/mtbe/EOTasks.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
70. Id.

The Future of Environmental Regulation After Article 1110 of NAFTA

The Future of Environmental Regulation After Artitle 1110 of NAFTA
based on the findings in the UC Report, as
well as comments on the UC Report by the
U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.
The Executive Order assigned eleven
tasks to be carried out by various state agencies. 7 1 The California Air Resources Board
was ordered to develop a timetable for the removal of MTBE from California gasoline by
the earliest possible date. 72 The Order de-

clared a complete phase-out of MTBE shall
be in effect by no later than December 31,
2002. 7 3 In addition, state agencies were re-

quired to analyze the impact of ethanol on
the environment in order to find a substitute
gasoline additive for fuel.7 4 Finally, the Executive Order did not require a direct ban of
MTBE in gasoline but, instead, assigned tasks
to state agencies towards regulating
problems associated with MTBE contamina75
tion of drinking water supplies.

D. Ethanol: A Potential Alternative to
MTBE
After the issuance of the Executive Order, ethanol received new attention as a potential fuel additive. Ethanol (also known as
ethyl alcohol or grain alcohol) is a clear, colorless liquid made primarily from grains or
other renewable agricultural feedstocks, such
as sugar cane and corn. Ethanol is being promoted because it is a renewable, biomassbased source of fuel and because its perceived environmental impacts are less than
those associated with MTBE. 76

Proponents

also claim that ethanol-blended gasoline will
reduce dependence on imports of foreign oil
and expand the market for ethanol-producing
crops. Ethanol may also benefit the environ71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Statement of Defense of Respondent at 22,
Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, available at http://
www.methanex.com/investorcentre/MTBE.htm [hereinafter
Statement of Defense].
76. Executive Summary, Dec. 1999, at 2 [hereinafter
Exec. Summary).
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ment by reducing carbon dioxide and carbon
monoxide emissions, and by contributing to
77
a net reduction in ozone-causing gases.
Methanex contended that the Executive
Order unfairly promoted ethanol as a fuel additive, which is primarily produced by the
U.S.-based company Archer Daniels Midland
(ADM).

78

ADM is a leading agricultural com-

pany headquartered in Decatur, Illinois, and
produces ethanol from corn at various facili79
ties throughout the Midwest.
E. Methanex: Claims and Background
Methanex is a Canadian corporation involved in the production, transportation, and
marketing of methanol. Methanex is headquartered in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, and is the largest marketer and
producer of methanol in the world, with facilities in Canada, the United States, Chile, New
Zealand, and Trinidad. 80 Its U.S. production
facility (Methanex Fortier) closed in 1999.81
As of 2000, Methanex owned world-wide production facilities with an annual capacity of
82
approximately 7.0 million tons of methanol.
Approximately one-third of Methanex-pro83
duced methanol is used for MTBE.
On June 15, 1999, Methanex Corporation
notified the United States of its intention to
seek damages under NAFTA in relation to the
California decision to ban MTBE. 8 4 Methanex
claimed that the California ban on MTBE substantially damaged Methanex, its U.S. investors,

and

its

shareholders. 8 5

Methanex

claimed that California's actions deprived,
77. Canadian Renewable Fuels Association, Ethanol
Fuels Are a Proven Technology, available at http://www.green
fuels.org/ethatech.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
78. Claimant's Draft Amended Complaint at 4,
Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, available at http://
www.methanex.com/investorcentre/MTBE.htm [hereinafter
Draft Amended Complaint] (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
79. Larry Cunningham, Senior Vice President Corporate Affairs, ADM Company, ADM Expands Ethanol Distribution
Network to New York: New Terminal to Ease Transition to CleanBurning, Renewable Ethanol, ADM News, July 30, 2001, available
at http://www.admworld.com/news/articies/pdf-releases/
07_30_01_ethanol.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).

and would continue to deprive Methanex Corporation of a substantial portion of its customer base, goodwill, and the California
market for methanol. 86 Methanex further
contended that the California measures reduced the demand for methanol and that this
decline would continue.8 7 Methanol was a
commodity with a substantially uniform
global price, and Methanex asserted that the
California phase-out of MTBE would continue
88
to reduce the global methanol price.
Because California significantly influences national environmental matters,
Methanex claimed that the state's decision to
ban MTBE is based on a flawed information
and would create a "ripple effect" across the
United States. 89 Therefore, Methanex argued
that the anticipated restrictions on MTBE
placed by other U.S. states constituted additional harm to Methanex, its investments,
and shareholders.
Methanex further stated that the result
of the Executive Order was an immediate
drop in its market value on the Toronto Stock
Exchange.90 In just ten days, Methanex stock
declined by approximately $180,000,000 (Canadian dollars). Methanex claimed that the
loss was directly caused by California's actions.9 '

In the draft amended complaint,
Methanex asserted that the Executive Order
discriminated against MTBE in favor of the
domestically produced ethanol.9 2 The phaseout of MTBE acknowledged the underground
83.

Id.

84. News Release- Methanex Seeks Damages Under NAF'A
for California MTBE Ban, June 15, 1999, available at http://www.

methanex.com/investorcentre/newsreleases/nafta.pdf
visited Oct. 15, 2002).

(last

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Draft Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 36.
88. id.
89. id.

80. Draft Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 3-4.

90. Draft Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 37.

81. Id. at 5.

91. Id.

82. Draft Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 32.

92. Id. at 32.
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storage tank (UST) 93 issue, but focused attention on one gasoline component, namely
MTBE. 94 It thus treated a symptom (MTBE)
of gasoline leakage, rather than the leakage
itself, deflecting attention from California's
95
failure to enforce its environmental law.
The amended complaint also alleged that
Archer Daniels Midland, the main supplier of
ethanol, improperly influenced and misled
Governor Gray Davis. 96 Methanex claimed
that the ban resulted because of lobbying by
ADM and amounted to discrimination in
favor of ethanol. Michael Macdonald, the
Vice-President of Methanex's Planning and
Strategic Development, stated, "[wlhat we are
alleging is that under international law, which
is what the NAFTA looks to, those sorts of ac' 97
tions are improper."

discrimination principle; and 4) an ostensibly
legitimate measure taken by a State cannot
be a disguised form of protection, but must
be the least trade-restrictive of the reasonably remaining alternatives.100

Accordingly, Methanex's claims included: 1) approximately $1 billion damages
suffered by Methanex Corporation, its investments, and its shareholders as a result of the
U.S. breach of Articles 1102, 1105, and 11 10 of
NAFTA; 2) the costs of arbitration plus taxes;
98
and 3) applicable interest.
F. Methanex's Claims in Relation to
NAFTA Article 1105

Methanex also asserted that the ban on
MTBE was unreasonable because there were
better alternatives to solve the problem of
leaking MTBE into drinking water. 10 4 In particular, Methanex claimed that Davis could
have instead upgraded the existing gasoline
tanks and fixed the leaks, as well as extended
regulatory jurisdiction over all UST's in the
state. 10 5 These measures could have elimi10 6
nated up to 97% of UST leaks.

Article 1105 of NAFTA requires that "fair
and equitable treatment" shall be accorded to
all foreign investments. 99 This doctrine of fair
and equitable treatment embodies four principles of international law: 1) a decisionmaker acting independently and in the public
interest must not be biased by pecuniary considerations; 2) state officials must act reasonably and in good faith; 3) the non-

Finally, Methanex claimed that Davis violated the duty to act independently and in
good faith when he executed the Executive
Order after accepting political contributions
from a party that stood to benefit from the
decision. 0 7 Methanex believed that California violated Article 1105 by acting unfairly, inequitably, and in a discriminatory manner in
08
both intent and effect.

93. The UST issue deals with underground storage
tanks that store gasoline containing MTBE. The leakage of
these tanks is a potential source of MTBE contamination.
For more information, visit U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, MTBE (methyl tertiary-butyl ether) and Underground Storage Tanks, available at http://www.epa.gov/
swerustl/mtbe/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
94. Draft Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 32.
95. Id.
at 29.
96. Id. at 51.

Article 1105 requires States to act reasonably and in good faith. 1 1 Methanex
claimed that Governor Davis' decision to ban
MTBE was unfair and inequitable because he
received misinformation and political contributions from ADM that misled him and affected his decision about the leakage of
10 2
MTBE into drinking water supplies.
Methanex asserted that Governor Gray Davis
lacked the independence and impartiality
that neutral decision makers need under in03
ternational law norms.

99 Id. at 48.
100. Id. at 49.
101. Id. at 51.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 55.
105. Id. at 55-56.

97. Steve Mertl, Methanex Alleges Dirty Politics Behind California Ban on Clean-GasAdditive, THE CAN. PRESS, Mar. 8, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 15636836.

106. Id. at 56.

98. Draft Amended Complaint, supra note 79, at 37-38.

108. Id. at 57.

107. Id.
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G. Methanex Claims: NAFTA Article 1110
Methanex also claimed that the California measures to phase out MTBE violated Article 1110.109 The United States "took a
measure ... tantamount to ...expropriation
of .
.
an investment"'' l by preventing
Methanex from maintaining its market share,
and transferred that share to the domestic
ethanol industry. Although some deference
may be afforded to a state's exercise of its
regulatory powers, discriminatory regulation
may constitute an expropriation."'
Methanex argued expropriation under
NAFTA included a wide range of governmental acts. Expropriation includes deliberate
and open takings of property and incidental
interference with the use of property, which
partially or entirely deprives the owner of the
use of "reasonably-to-be" expected economic
112
benefit of property.
Methanex asserted that market share,
goodwill, and market access can all be illegally expropriated.' 1 3 It cited Pope and Talbot v.
Canada,114 where the Tribunal held that the investor's access to the U.S. market is a prop5
erty interest protected by Article 1110.'1
There, the NAFTA Tribunal issued its decision
in favor of Pope and Talbot, concluding that
the investor properly asserted that Canada
had taken measures affecting its "investment," as defined in Article 1139 and Article
1110.116

Methanex also claimed that the measures taken by California were not intended
to serve a "public purpose" as required by Article 1110.117 Instead, Methanex asserted
that the phase-out of MTBE was a mechanism for seizing the Methanex, Methanex
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U.S., and Methanex Fortiers' shares of the
California oxygenate market and transferring
it to the ethanol industry.'' 8 These measures
were intended to protect the U.S. ethanol industry and were not imposed in a "non-discriminatory manner."' 19
Finally, Methanex claimed the measures
taken by the California legislature failed to
meet the Article 1110(c) requirement that
they comply with "due process of law and Article 1105(1)" of NAFTA.1 20 Methanex therefore seeks compensation for the harm
imposed by measures tantamount to expropriation.
H. The United States' Defense Against
Methanex
The United States denied all of
Methanex's claims.' 2 1 The U.S. contended
that Chapter 11 of NAFTA did not hold a state
responsible for damages to every business
enterprise claiming a setback whenever a
state took action to protect the public health
or the environment. Dismissing Methanex's
claims as absurd, the U.S. argued that if the
NAFTA Tribunal adopted Methanex's construction of Article I 110, then no NAFTA Party
could carry out its fundamental governmental
functions unless it was prepared to pay for
every economic impact that resulted. 122 The
U.S. also challenged Methanex's claims on a
23
jurisdictional and admissibility basis.1
Article 1101 of NAFTA limits claims to
measures adopted or maintained by a Party
relating to investors or investments of another Party. 24 The United States argued that
neither the Senate Bill nor the Executive Order was a "measure ...relating to" an invest25
ment of Methanex in the United States.

109. Id. at 69.

117. Id. at 70.

110. Id. at 70.

118. Id.

111. 111 Id.

119. Id.

112. Id. at 69.

120. Draft Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 70.

113. Id.

121. Statement of Defense, supra note 75, at I.

114. For more information on Pope and Talbot v. Canada,
go to NAFTAlaw.org, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com
(last visited Oct. 15, 2002).

122. 122 Id. at 2.
123. Id.

115. Draft Amended Complaint, supra note 79, at 69.

124. NAFTA, supra note 2,art. 1101 (a)-(b).

116. Id.

125. Statement of Defense, supra note 75, at 28.
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The U.S. interpreted Article 1 101 to require a
legally significant connection between the
measure taken and the affected investment or
investor. 126 According to the U.S., Methanex
27
could not show this connection.
The U.S. also argued that Article 1116 of
NAFTA does not grant jurisdiction over claims
for injuries suffered by an enterprise. Article
1116 permits a claim by an investor on its
own behalf, but it does not permit claims by
aggrieved shareholders, as Methanex tried to
claim. In sum, the United States contended
that Methanex cannot claim a loss independent of that allegedly suffered by the enter28
prises at issue. 1
The United States also argued that
Methanex's claim failed to identify an expropriated "investment" within the scope of
Chapter 11.129 Methanex did not claim that
its U.S. holdings were nationalized or expropriated. Instead, it claimed that California's
actions constituted a taking of Methanex U.S.
& Fortier's business.130 Moreover, the United
States contended that Methanex failed to
identify an interest within the definition of
"investment" under Chapter 11.131 Article
1139 defined "investment" for purposes of
Chapter 11, but Methanex's definition of a
"business" as an enterprise does not appear
in Article 1139.132
The United States maintained that there
has been no direct expropriation of
Methanex's investments.13 3 Methanex identified only two relevant U.S. subsidiaries, and
alleged that the "business" of those subsidiaries has been expropriated. 134 However, the
U.S. argued that neither Methanex U.S. nor

The Future of Environmental Regulation After Article 1110 of NAFTA
Methanex Fortier was nationalized or confiscated and no expropriation had been
proven. 135 The only claim that could create
an inference of an expropriation is the
Methanex subsidiaries' anticipated reduced
sale of methanol. 136 According to the United
States, market assurances for methanol did
not constitute a property interest, and that no
domestic or international laws assured a con1 37
tinued market for any given product.
Finally, the United State argued that
Methanex's claims for $970 million in damages lacked merit. 1 38 The long-term decline
in Methanex's share price reflected the oversupply of methanol in the industry, and was
not due to the measures complained of by
Methanex. 39 In fact, the United States noted
that the global price of methanol had actually
increased substantially since the Executive
4
Order announcement in March 1999.' 0
!. First Partial Award
On August 7, 2002, the Tribunal issued
its first partial award. 1 4 1 At the time of the
partial award, the Tribunal had not heard any
testimony or other evidence, and the Award
made no finding of fact.' 42 The purpose of
the Tribunal's decision on the Award was limited to the United States' challenges on juris14 3
diction and admissibility - nothing more.
1. U.S. Challenges to Jurisdiction.
In general, the Tribunal rejected the U.S.
jurisdictional challenges to Article 1102, 1105
and 11 10.144 The only challenge the Tribunal
ruled in favor of was the one regarding Article
1101.145

126. Id.

137. Id.

127. Id. at 29.

138. Id. at 44.

128. Id. at 30.
129. Id. at 31.

130. id. at 32, italics original.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 37.

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See First Partial Award, available at http:/www.
naftaclaims.com (last visited Apr.12, 2003).
142. Id. at 22.

134. id.

143. Id.

135. Id.

144. Id. at 58.

136. Id. at 38.

145. Id.
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The issue regarding Article 1101 was
whether the U.S. actions "related to"
Methanex, because none of the measures
were expressly directed at methanol, methanol producers, or Methanex. 14 6 The Tribunal

concluded that "relating to" under Article
1101 of NAFTA signified something more than
the effect of a measure on an investor or investment.

47

Instead, it required a legally sig-

2. U.S. Challenges to Admissibility.
The U.S. challenges to admissibility were
based on the legal submission that
Methanex's claims were bound to fail because, even assuming all the alleged facts to
be true, there could never be a breach of the
individual provisions pleaded by
Methanex.

56

However, the Tribunal held that

nificant connection between them, as argued
14
by the U.S. 8

it had no express or implied power to reject

Methanex's Original Statement of Claim
did not meet the essential requirements of
alleging facts with a legally significant connection between the U.S. measures,

challenges generally. 1

Methanex, and its investments. 149 Thus, as

pleaded, the Tribunal held that it did not
have jurisdiction over the Original Statement
of Claim.1

50

As to the Amended Statement of Claim,
the Tribunal did not consider the case clear
enough to determine whether or not
Methanex's allegations based on "intent"
were sufficiently credible.'

51

At that stage, it

was not possible for the Tribunal to decide
whether or not any measure did or did not
52
relate to Methanex or its investments.

the claims based on inadmissibility.

57

Thus,

the Tribunal rejected the U.S.'s admissiblity
58

I.Methanex's Second Amended
Statement of Claim
Methanex filed its second Amended
9
Statement of Claim on November 5, 2002.'1
In the second amended claim, Methanex
stated that it was suing over economic protectionism - it was not trying to expand international guarantees in a way that could
threaten nations' or states' ability to enact
valid

environmental

law.

160

Methanex

claimed that California's unlawful protectionism is exactly the type of harm that Chapter
11 was meant to prevent.'

61

In effect, the Tribunal required Methanex
to re-plead its case in a new Statement of

Methanex specifically challenged two
measures adopted by California: (1) California Executive Order D-5-999; and (2) California Code of Regulations, title 13, § 2260

Claim. 153 The Original Claim failed the juris-

("CaRFG3 Regulations").

dictional test under Article 1101 and potentially only a portion of the Amended Claim
fairness, the Tribunal required Methanex to

ulations provided that only ethanol could be
used as an oxygenate in California's gasoline,
effectively banning MTBE and methanol from
competing with ethanol in the California oxy-

make a fresh pleading.155

genate market. 1

could survive that test as well. 154 Thus, in all

146. Id. at 59.
147. Id. at 70.

62

The CaRFG3 Reg-

63

157. Id. at 57.
158. Id.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 73.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 76.
152. id.
153. Id. at 77.

159. See Claimant Methanex Corporations' Second
Amended Statement of Claim, Nov. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visted Apr. 12, 2003)
Ihereinafter Second Claiml.
160. Id. at 4.
161. Id.

154. Id.
155. Id.

162. Id. at 7.

156. id. at 49.

163. Id. at 8.
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Methanex also provided an analysis of
164
the law showing impermissible intent.
Methanex contended that U.S. measures
were, on their face, intended to favor only domestic ethanol producers, which denied national treatment to ethanol's foreign

11 10 of NAFTA. 1 7 4 Specifically, it was alleged

5

competitors. 16

Methanex then attempted to illustrate
how the U.S. intentionally planned to shut
out all foreign competitors of ethanol.'6
First, Methanex contended that California intended to harm foreign methanol producers,
including

Methanex.

67

Methanex

alleged

that California's measures were impermissibly protectionist, and on their face, were de
jure

discrimination.168

Second,

Methanex

claimed that discriminatory intent can be inferred from the foreseen disparate impact
California's measures would have on foreign
investors and their investments.

69

Allegedly,

that discriminatory intent was evident from
the U.S.'s traditional protection of its domestic ethanol industry and from the fact that
MTBE alone was banned, while other danger17 0
ous chemicals were not.

Methanex further tried to show discriminatory intent from the role that ADM played
in the ethanol industry. 1 7

Methanex con-

tended that ADM secured its place in the ethanol market through political contributions
and lobbying.

72

Finally, Methanex claimed

that the harm to foreign competitors was
foreseeable and probable, and that anti-foreign corporate bias against methanol and
MTBE pervades national politics in the
U.S.1 73

that the operative intent for purposes of Article 1102 must be discriminatory intent, or intent to deny national treatment, as opposed
to intent to harm foreign investors or their investments. 1 75 Article
1102(3) governs
Methanex's claim, which provides that investors and their investments in the territory of
another Party will receive national treatment. 76 Furthermore, Article 1102 limits
protection to the class of investors and in77
vestments who are in "like circumstances."'1
Methanex claimed that the critical test for
"likeness" is competition. 78 Thus, Methanex
asserted that it is in "like circumstances" with
the protected domestic ethanol producers,
79
but it had not received national treatment. 1
With regard to Article 1105, Methanex
contended that the California measures were
intended to discriminate against foreign investors and their investmentss, which is, by
definition, unfair and inequitable. 8 0 Thus,
Article 1105 was breached because California
did not give Methanex "fair and equitable
8
treatment and full protection and security."' '
Furthermore, the United States' breach of Article 1102 "establishes a breach of Article
18 2
1105 as well."'
The final contention of Methanex stated
that the California measures violated Article
I 110. First, Methanex stated that a substantial portion of its investments were taken by
facially discriminatory measures and given to
the U.S. ethanol industry. 8 3 Second, the
measures were a mechanism primarily intended to seize Methanex's share of the Cali-

Methanex asserted that the California
measures violated Articles 1102, 1105 and
164. Id.

174. Id. at 120, 128.

165. Id. at 24.

175. Id. at 121.

166. Id. at 58.

176. Id.

167. Id.

177. Id. at 122.

168. Id. at 65.

178. Id. at 123.

169. Id. at 68.

179. Id. at 125.

170. Id. at 71, 77.

180. Id. at 128.

171. Id. at 82.

181. Id.

172. Id. at 83.

182. Id.

173. Id. at 109, 111.

183. Id. at 129.
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Third, the
fornia oxygenate market.18 4
discriminatory nature of the measures did not
comply with "due process of law and Article
1105(1)."185 Finally, Methanex was not compensated for the harm it received as a result
18 6
of the California measures.

only to gasoline refiners and ethanol is sold
only to gasoline distributors. 19 3 Furthermore,
ethanol and MTBE are produced using different processes, and thus, there is no "zerosum" competititon between the two chemi94
cals.'

Accordingly, Methanex claimed: (1) damages of $970 million as a result of the U.S.
breach of Articles 1102, 1105 and 1110; (2) the
cost of arbitration; and (3) applicable inter-

Finally, the U.S. contended that the California measures at dispute do not "relate to"
Methanex within the meaning of Article
1101(1) of NAFTA.' 9 5 Thus, Methanex's
claims fall outside the scope of the Tribunal's
jurisdiction to hear the claims. 196

est. 187
K. United States' Supplemental Statement
of Defense.
On March 21, 2003, the United States
filed its supplemental statement of defense,
addressing the issue of whether or not California intended to harm methanol producers
when it issued the ban on MTBE. 18 8 The U.S.
contended that there was no support for
Methanex's claim that the MTBE ban was intended to harm methanol producers, specifically Methanex.' 8 9 Instead, the U.S. asserted
that the purpose of the ban was to addresss
the problem of MTBE contamination of California's drinking water.' 90
Moreover, for
Methanex's claim to succeed, the U.S.
claimed that a majority of the individual actors involved in adopting the measures would
have to have been acting in bad faith.' 9 1
The United States asserted that, as
demonstrated on the record, California
harbors no ill will toward Methanex. 19 2 The
United States contended that oxygenate producers do not face a real choice between
methanol and ethanol because MTBE is sold
184. Id.

185.

id.

186. id.
187. Id. at 132.
188. See Supplemental Statement of Defense on Intent of Respondent United States of America, March 21,
2003, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com [hereinafter
Supplemental Statement].
189. Id. at 11.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 13.
192. Id. at 17.
193. Id. at 21.

The Methanex case is currently being arbi197
trated in Washington, D.C.
!11.

Metalclad v. Mexico

In 1997, the U.S.-based Metalclad corporation filed for arbitration against Mexico
under Chapter II of NAFTA. 198 The outcome
of the case raised many issues about the potential consequences of NAFTA and about the
powers of governments to pursue environmental policies that adversely affect foreign
investors. At a fundamental level, the case
calls into the question the basic powers that
governments retain over their own territories. 199
A. Background
In January 1993, Mexico's National Ecological Institute (INE) issued a federal permit
to the Mexican firm Coterin for the construction of a hazardous waste landfill in the La
Pedrera Valley, located in the state of San
Luis Potosi.200 In May 1993, San Luis Potosi
194. Id. at 21, 23.
195. Id. at 33.
196. Id.
197. For more information regarding the current status of the Methanex arbitration, go to http://www.nafta
claims.com.
198. For more information on the NAFTA claim documents of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States,
go to http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Nov. 12,

2002).
199. 199 Mary Bottari, NAFTA's Investor "Rights," MULMONITOR, Apr. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL
15520474.

TINATIONAL

200. Final Award, supra note 44, at 11.
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granted Coterin a land use permit for the
landfill, with the caveat that the permit did

not authorize

the

facility's

operation. 20 1

Metalclad then entered into an option agreement to acquire Coterin and its permits in or20 2

der to construct and operate the facility.

Metalclad was advised by INE's president and
the director-general of Mexico Secretariat of
Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE)
that, except for a federal operating permit, all
the required permits for the facility had been
secured by

Coterin. 20 3

In September 1993,

Metalclad exercised its option to purchase
Coterin. 20 4 Despite local opposition, Metal-

clad secured an 18-month extension of the
INE construction permit and began construction of the landfill in May 1994.205 In October

1994, the neighboring City of Guadalcazur ordered Metalclad to halt construction for failing to obtain a municipal construction
permit. 20

6

Although

Metalclad

contended

INE had assured that no such municipal permit was required, Metalclad proceeded to apply for a municipal construction permit to
avoid conflict. 20 7 With the application in pro-

cess, Metalclad received INE approval for
20 8
completion and resumed landfill work.

The landfill facility was approved and
scheduled to open in March 1995.209 Opening ceremonies, however, were blocked by
demonstrators and with assistance from local
state troopers, the landfill remained closed
until November 1995.210

In order to open

without such opposition, Metalclad entered
into a "Convenio" with INE and the Mexican
Federal Attorney's Office for the Protection of
the Environment (PROFEPA) requiring Metal-

clad to: 1) carry out remediation measures at
the site; 2) designate an area of its land as a
reserve for native species; 3) create a scientific advisory committee to monitor the
remediation work; 4) provide a discount for
locally generated hazardous waste; 5) contribute to local civic organizations; and 6) provide free medical services to the Guadalcazar
21
community. '
Meanwhile, the Guadalcazar City Council
denied Metalclad's request for a municipal
construction permit, without giving Metalclad
the opportunity to comment. 21 2 Guadalcazar
then brought suit challenging the federal
Convenio. 21 3 A preliminary injunction was
granted and the action was finally dismissed. 21 4 While the action was pending, INE
granted Metalclad another permit authorizing
an expansion of the landfill despite the fact
2 15
that the facility was dormant.
In September 1997, the Governor of San
Luis Potosi issued an Ecological Decree that
established a protecte d natural area for a rare
cactus. 216 The Natural Area included the
landfill site, thereby preventing any future operation of the landfill.
B. Metalclad's Claims
Metalclad submitted its Notice of Arbi-

tration on January 2,

201. Id. at 12.

213. Id. at 18.

202. Id. at 13.

214. Id.

203. Id.

1997.217

Metalclad al-

leged that Mexico violated several parts of
NAFTA Chapter 11, § A. 21 8 Metalclad also
claimed that Mexico denied it "national treatment" and "most favored nation" treatment,
21 9
and violated international law.

215. Id.

204. Id.

205. Id.
206. Id. at 14.
207. Id.

216. id. at 19.
217. Notice of Arbitration, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).

208. Id.
209. Id. at 15.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 16-17.
212. id.at 17.

218. Specifically, Metalclad claimed that Mexico had
violated: Article 1102(1), (2) and (3); Article 1103; Article
1104; Article 1105; Article I106(l)(f); Article 1110; and Article 1111.
219. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 217, at 4.
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Metalclad contended that it had acted in
good faith, detrimentally relied on the assurances of state and federal officials, and spent
millions of dollars on tests, reports, studies,
and analyses in order to satisfy Mexican officials. 220 The refusal by city officials to permit

the opening and operating of the landfill directly and indirectly expropriated Metalclad's
investment and enterprise. 2 21 Metalclad ar-

gued that this was an unlawful taking under
Article 1110 of NAFTA. 222 The expropriation

was not made on a non-discriminatory basis,
and was not in accordance with due process
of law and minimum standard of treatment
requirements. 223

Metalclad

sought

$43,125,000 (US) in compensation plus damages for the value of its enterprise, which had
2 24
not yet been fully determined.
C. Mexico's Defenses
Mexico denied all claims, asserting that
the Ecological Decree was outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because the Decree
was enacted after Metalclad filed the Intent of
Arbitration. 225 Furthermore, Mexico claimed
that Article 1119 of NAFTA precluded claims
226
for breaches that have not yet occurred.

Mexico also relied on Article 1120 of
NAFTA, which requires that six months pass
between the events giving rise to a claim and
the filing of the claim. 227 Mexico argued that
228
a claim must be ripe at the time it is filed.

Mexico asserted (after adjusting its position
from a former claim) that Section B of Chapter 11 does not consider the amendment of
ripened claims to include post-claim
events. 229

D. Metalclad's Chapter I I Arbitration
On January 2, 1997, Metalclad demanded

230
arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
Metalclad claimed that Mexico was responsible under international law for its conduct
and that San Luis Potosi and Guadalcazar
had violated NAFTA §1105 (fair and equitable
treatment of investments) and §1110 (which
prohibits any party from expropriating invest-

ments - directly or indirectly - or taking any

measure "tantamount" to expropriation, without compensation). 23 1 Mexico again denied

232
all claims.
Metalclad argued its case before a panel
of three arbitrators at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-

SID). 233 The first session of the Tribunal was

held in Washington D.C. on July 15, 1997, in
which the Tribunal determined that Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada would be the
234
arbitration site.

D. The Metalclad Tribunal's Decision

The Metalclad Tribunal ultimately ruled for
Metalclad and found Mexico in breach of
Chapter 11.235 Mexico was ordered to pay
$16.7 million in compensatory damages to
Metalclad. 236 This was the first suit brought

under Chapter 11 of NAFTA in which the Tri237
bunal ruled in favor of the Investor.

I. Article 1105: Fair and Equitable
Treatment

Under Article 1105, the Tribunal found
that Metalclad was not treated fairly or equitably by Mexico. The Tribunal focused on
whether a municipal permit for the construc-

220. Id. at 5.

230. Kass & McCarroll, supra note 43.

221. Final Award, supra note 44, at 33.

231. NAFTA, supra note 2. art. 1105, 1110.

222. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 217, at 6.

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Final Award, supra note 44, at 19-20.

232. Final Award, supra note 44, at 1.
233. Id. at 4.
234. Id. at 4-5.

226- Id. at 20.

235. Id. at 42.

227. Id.

236. Id.

228. Id.
229. Id.

237. Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, supra note 10.
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tion of a hazardous waste landfill was re-

tantamount to expropriation, which violates
245
Article 1110 of NAFTA.

quired. 238 Metalclad believed that the federal

and state permits it had already secured
would allow for the operation and construction of the landfill and that the municipalities
had not authority over hazardous waste matters. 239 Mexico responded that the munici-

pality had a constitutional right to issue
construction permits.

240

The Tribunal found that the Mexican federal authority had controlling jurisdiction
over hazardous waste evaluations and assessments, and that the municipality only had authority over particular construction
considerations. 24'

The

municipality could

only deny a permit for reasons relating to the
physical construction or defects of the site
and had improperly denied the permit on en-

242
vironmental impact grounds.

2. Article 11 10: Expropriation
The Tribunal also found that Mexico had
indirectly expropriated Metalclad's invest243
ment without providing compensation.
Therefore, Mexico was in violation of Article
I 110 of NAFTA.
According to the Tribunal, expropriation
under Article I 110 includes open, deliberate,
and acknowledged takings of property such as
outright seizure, as well as covert or incidental interference with the use of property
which deprives the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be244
expected economic benefit of the property.
The Tribunal found that by participating in
the denial of the right to operate the landfill,
Mexico must be held to have taken a measure

According to the Tribunal, the Municipality exceeded its authority when it denied the
construction permit based on the environmental effects of the hazardous waste landfill. 246 The denial of the permit combined
with the representations of the Mexican federal government on which Metalclad relied,
and the absence of a timely, substantive basis for the denial of the local construction
permit, amounted to an indirect expropria24 7
tion.
The Tribunal identified other grounds for
finding an expropriation in the Ecological Decree. 248 By declaring the area which included
the landfill site an ecological preserve, the
Decree effectively barred the operation of the
landfill forever. 249 The Tribunal was not persuaded by Mexico's claims to the contrary,
and the Tribunal did not need to consider the
motivation or intent of the adoption of the
25 0
Decree.
3. The Tribunal Award
The Tribunal found that NAFTA was intended to promote cross-border investment
opportunities. 2 5' According to the Tribunal,
"transparency" was a key principle through
which to accomplish that goal. 252 Transparency means that investors should have access to information concerning relevant legal
requirements so that they can initiate and
operate their investments. 25 3 If government
authorities become aware of any basis for
misunderstanding or confusion, it is their
duty to make sure the correct position is immediately clarified. 254 Because Mexico failed

238. Final Award, supra note 44, at 27.

248. Id. at 35.

239. Id. at 28.

249. Id.
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to ensure a "transparent and predictable
framework" for Metalclad's business planning, it undermined the company's expectation of fair and just treatment in accordance
255
with NAFTA.
The Tribunal ultimately awarded Metalclad $16,685,000.00, based on Metalclad's investment in the project, less the disallowance
of expenses claimed for 1991 and 1992, less
the amount allowed for remediation, plus the
interest rate of 6% compounded annually. 25 6
E. Justice Tysoe's Review of the Metalclad
Tribunal's Decision
Mexico immediately appealed the Tribunal's decision. 25 7 Because the arbitration had
taken place in Vancouver, B.C., the Supreme
Court of British Columbia heard the appeal. 258 The Honorable Mr. Justice Tysoe presided over the case and held that the review
of the Award would be governed by the provisions of the International Commercial Arbi259
tration Act (CAA).

1. Article 1105 - Minimum Standard
Mexico argued that the Tribunal committed two acts in excess of jurisdiction under
Article 1105.260 First, Mexico claimed that the
Tribunal used the transparency provisions of
NAFTA as a basis for finding a breach of Article 1105.261 Second, Mexico claimed that the
Tribunal went beyond the transparency provisions of NAFTA and created new transparency
obligations. 26 2 As a result, the Tribunal improperly interpreted Mexican domestic law. 263
Furthermore, Mexico argued that the Tribunal
wrongly found that Mexico had conceded dur-

ing the arbitration that Metalclad was not required to exhaust local remedies before
26 4
seeking arbitration under NAFTA.
Justice Tysoe held that the Tribunal misstated the applicable law to include transparency obligations.265
The principle of
transparency is prevalent throughout Chapter
18, not Chapter 11 of NAFTA. 266 Justice Tysoe
concluded that the Tribunal's finding on the
transparency issue had exceeded the scope of
the submission to arbitration. 267 Therefore,
he stated that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the Tribunal improperly made deci26 8
sions of Mexican domestic law.
2. Article 1110-Expropriation and
Compensation
Mexican counsel argued that the Tribunal improperly considered the Ecological Decree in basing its decision under Article
1110.269 Three main issues arose from this
controversy:
I. Was the Tribunal correct in concluding
that it could consider the Ecological Decree with respect to Article 1110?
2. Did the Tribunal decide a matter beyond
the scope of its jurisdiction in concluding
that the Ecological Decree constituted an
act tantamount to expropriation?
3. Was it patently unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that the announcement of
the Ecological Decree constituted an act
270
tantamount to expropriation?
Justice Tysoe concluded that no error resulted from the Tribunal considering the Ecological Decree. 27' The Court also held that
notwithstanding the breach of Article 1105,
the Tribunal's conclusion with respect to the

255. Id.

262. Id.

256. Final Award, supra note 44, at 42.

263. id.

257. Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico: A Play in Three
Parts, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Papers/JWI%20
Article%20Final.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
258. Defense of Canadian Liberty Committee- Mexico v.
Metalclad. Full Reasons for Judgment Tysoe, May 22, 2001, available at http://www.canadianliberty.bc.ca/nafta/mexico-vsmetalclad.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
259. Id.
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Ecological Decree stood on its own and was
not based on a lack of transparency. 272 Finally, Tysoe did not believe that the Tribunal
made a patently unreasonable error with re273
spect to the Ecological Decree.

ted contrary to its obligations, any Award to
the claimant should, as far as is possible,
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and re-establish the situation which
would in all probability have existed if that
act had not been committed." 28 ' The Metalclad Tribunal established guidelines for interpreting domestic law and determining
compensation for future Chapter 11 disputes.

3. Tysoe's Conclusion
In his conclusion, Justice Tysoe held that
274
the award should be partially set aside.
Mexico succeeded in challenging the first two
of the Tribunal's findings of breach of Articles
1105 and 1110, but it was not successful on
the remaining points. The Court granted
Metalclad 75% of its costs from that proceed5
ing. 27
F. The Aftermatch of Metaclad
The Metalclad arbitration illuminated
two main principles for future NAFTA cases.
First, the panel demonstrated that it would
not shirk from interpreting the federal, state,
and local laws of the parties involved. 276 The
arbitrators interpreted the applicable Mexican laws and the extent to which the Mexican
government could apply its own laws in its
own territory without paying compensation to
foreign investors. Second, the Tribunal's decision adopted an American perspective in its
interpretation of state and local laws. 277 The

Tribunal recognized private property rights
that are protected under U.S. law but that are
not recognized by either Canadian or Mexican
law.

2 78

Finally, the Metalclad arbitration was the
first case brought under Chapter 11 in which
a tribunal comprehensively explored the issue of damages. 279 In determining the Award,
the Tribunal reasoned that the fair market
value would be best determined by reference
to Metalclad's actual investment in the project. 280 Furthermore, "where the state has ac272.

Id.

273. id.
274.

id.

IV. Analysis of Article I1 10-Environmental
Regulation and the Effects of the
Cases.
The goals of Chapter 11 of NAFTA are to
establish a secure environment for investors
by creating rules for fair treatment, removing
barriers to investment, and providing an efficient way to resolve disputes between a the
foreign investor and the host country. However, the potential for abuse of Article 11 10
by private corporations may adversely affect
domestic environmental regulation. Unforeseen problems have arisen and claims are being brought against the three countries by
private investors.
The new, expansive definition of property
rights under Chapter 11 unsettles many observers. 28 2 Private foreign companies can ex-

ploit NAFTA's ambiguity and force
governments to pay for enacting environmental laws that cut into the companies' profits.
If Methanex were to prevail, the U.S. government will effectively be forced to pay a Canadian company to stop producing a chemical
that is contaminating California's drinking
water. This scenario seems unfair to the citizens of California, who want to ensure their
health and do not want their water contaminated by MTBE leaks. Furthermore, it seems
even more unfair to other citizens of the
United States who are unaffected by MTBE
277. Id. at 261.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 270.

275. Id.
276. Lucien 1. Dhooge, The North American Free Trade

Agreement and the Environment: The Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 10 MINN. J.GLOBAL TRADE 209, 260
(2001).
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leaks yet must pay for the award through their
taxes.

A. The Environmental Effects of NAFTA
Chapter 1 1

Potential abuse by private corporations
seeking governmental compensation may
progress even further. The first governmental
lawsuits against national governments
started with claims such as that in Ethyl Corporation28 3 in 1996.

There are also many environmental effects of Chapter 11 that may not have been
considered by the NAFTA co-signers. The
treaty includes new corporate investment
rights and protections unprecedented in
scope and power. 29 1 Corporations that abuse
these rights may file immense compensation
claims that will subsequently discourage governments from passing environmental regulations that may adversely affect foreign
investors. Sixteen suits have been filed with
2 92
NAFTA tribunals thus far.

In Ethyl Corporation, a Toronto lawyer
named Barry Appleton sued Canada for its
ban on the U.S. company's gasoline additive. 284 Appleton has since regularly sued the

Canadian government and has delivered public alerts about the potential misuse of Chapter 11.285 Appleton even suggested that
Canadian hockey and baseball teams can sue
the United States because American cities
subsidize rival teams with taxpayer-financed
stadiums. 2

86

This may seem far-fetched, but

Appleton is correct that there have been few
limits placed on Chapter 11 arbitration and
that the potential for exploitation is immense.
National governments have also grown
wary of potential exploitation of Chapter
11.287 Mexico lost $16 million in the Metalclad
case. 288 Mexico City has subsequently recog-

nized that it may be a prime target for compensation and has assembled a team of
lawyers to aggressively defend against every
NAFTA claim filed against the city. 289 Accord-

ing to one of the lawyers on the team, if the
team had not been formed, Mexico would
have "become the insurer for every invest290
ment that goes awry in Mexico."

283. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, available at http://www.nafta
claims.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
284. Grieder, supra note 25.
285.

Id.

286. Id.
287. Grieder, supra note 25.

Many environmentalists worry that
NAFTA will permit foreign countries to successfully challenge U.S. domestic environmental laws and standards. 29 3 For example,
in 1991 Mexico successfully challenged the
U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)
as an illegal trade barrier under GATT. 29 4 The
United States enacted the MMPA in part to
prevent dolphins from being caught and
killed in the nets of tuna fishers. 295 The
MMPA banned the importation of tuna from
Mexico because Mexico did not adequately
regulate its fishing industry to prevent unnecessary harm to marine mammals. 296 However, Mexico succeeded in challenging the
MMPA, and a GATT panel decided that the
U.S. law was an illegal trade barrier under
GATT. 297 Because Chapter 11 of NAFTA allows foreign governments and private companies to challenge domestic laws, it may have
enormous implications on the security and
autonomy of the governments of the NAFTA
parties.
292. Thomas D. Elias, Canadian Firm Fights California
Ban on Chemical NAFTA Invoked on Gasoline Additive, The Wash.
Times, Apr. 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4152173.
293. Glenn M. Stoddard, Case Note and Comment,
Implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement for U.S.
Envtl. Law and Policy, 13 Wis. INT'L L.J. 317, 320 (1994).
294. Id.
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289. Grieder, supra note 25.
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Chapter 11 may have other major impacts on environmental law within NAFTA
countries. Foreign investors are using Chapter 11 as a strategic offensive threat against
governments which may render decisions
298
that may adversely affect their companies.
This activity may constrict environmental regulation and have a severe chilling effect on
any future proposals for environmental protection.2

99

The fallout from Metalclad and

Methanex illustrate the potential consequences of this abuse of NAFTA by private
corporations and investors.
B. The Environmental Effects of Metalclad
The Metalclad case has caused concern
among environmentalists because of the
Panel's apparent downgrading of "environmental concerns" that- conflict with a private
investor's expectations. 300 Critics of the case
point out that the Panel failed to acknowledge that another important goal of NAFTA is
regional environmental protection. 30 By focusing solely on the expropriation aspect of
Metalclad's claim, the Panel failed to balance
competing goals of NAFTA. Furthermore, it is
important to note that the Panel took it upon
itself to decide questions regarding Mexican
environmental law, specifically, the ability of
30 2
municipalities to regulate waste facilities.
Hugo Perezcano, Mexico's leading lawyer
in the Metalclad arbitration, wondered how the
Ecological Decree could have ever amounted
to a remediable expropriation under NAFTA's
Chapter 1 1.303 "This decision means when an

ecological decree affects the property rights
of foreign investors, even if it's lawful under
298. Mann, supra note 13 at 405
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our domestic law, then it should be regarded
as a compensable taking."304 Perezcano further stated that there was no evidence that
the decree had any impact in affecting Metalclad's business, and the decision of the
NAFTA tribunal amounted to the usurpation
of Mexican decision-making.305
The Tribunal's decision provides further
evidence that NAFTA and the environment
may be at odds. Michelle Swenarchuk of the
Canadian Environmental Law Association
stated, "NAFTA is saying, you can have your
local rules for dumping, but if a foreign company wants to dump . . . it can force you to
pay." 30 6

Municipalities

may have a tough

time turning away garbage in the future if foreign corporations are involved. 307 "This case
is a terrible example of how necessary environmental controls can become near impossible for local communities," said
Swenarchuk.

30 8

As a result of Metalclad, the Mexican government may choose to use NAFTA as a rationale for restricting the autonomy of local
governments. 30 9 According to Gerard Greenfield, 310 "federal governments are often willing to lose these cases in order to discipline
provincial, state, or municipal governments
which have adopted progressive social and
environmental policies." 31' If the Mexican
government does in fact want to control what
local authorities and states are doing and
disregard local environmental laws altogether, this may be an effective means for
them to go about it. This could have a devastating effect on Mexican environmental policy
as a whole and undermine any regional envi307. Id.

299. Dhooge, supra note 19, at 542.
300. Kass & McCarroll, supra note 43.
301. Id.
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308. Id.
309. Investment and Trade, available at http://www.mob
4glob.ca/invest.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
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306. John Newcomb, NAFTA Ruling Raises Environmental
Questions, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 1,2000, available
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(last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
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ronmental protection that localities want to
enforce.
Mexico has fairly strong environmental
protection legislation, but its enforcement of
this legislation has been weak. 31 2 Mexico's

environmental law is now enforced by the Social Development Secretariat (SEDESOL),
which replaced the former Urban Development and Ecology Secretariat (SEDUE) in
1992. 3 13

Both agencies have been criticized

for failing to enforce Mexico's environmental
laws. 3 14 Abuse of Chapter 11 by private cor-

porations may create more conflict within a
nation already plagued with problems such
as torture, human rights abuses, de facto one
party rule and an undemocratic electoral system. 3 15

Thus,

exploitative

NAFTA

claims

against Mexico may do more than merely hinder future environmental protection in Mexico, they may prevent it entirely.
C. The Environmental Effects of Methanex
Even before any final decisions are rendered, the Methanex case has significant implications. 31 6 Methanex's claims alone may
31 7
hinder future environmental regulation.
First, Methanex attempted to expand the definition of "expropriation" in ways that were
arguably never anticipated by the signers of
NAFTA. 31 8

If the definition of expropriation

were construed too broadly, private investors
may have greater opportunity to exploit Article 1110 and bring more suits against the
NAFTA parties.
Second, some see Methanex's claims as
an attempt to use NAFTA to rewrite the Executive Order after the company failed in its
campaign against the measure. 31 9 Although
Governor Davis issued the Executive Order to
reduce the contamination of California's

drinking water, the government may have to
pay dearly for its efforts. If Methanex succeeds in arbitration, California will be under
pressure to rescind its Executive Order in an
attempt to lessen the damage award. 320 The

Methanex case is "a clear threat to California
state sovereignty and democratic governance," said Martin Wagner of the Earthjustice
32
Legal Defense Fund. '
California legislators fear that if
Methanex succeeds, states will no longer be
32 2
able to regulate their own environments.
Instead, states may have to sacrifice some of
their sovereignty and defer to the federal government. In Metalclad, the Panel interpreted
the Mexican constitution and prevented local
authorities from exercising autonomy in regulating their local environments. The Panel's
approach could have devastating effects on
California's environment if the state must adhere to federal standards rather than its own
32 3
more stringent environmental regulations.
Many California regulations, including smog
control, are tougher than federal standards.

324

Lori Wallach, director of the Global

Trade Watch wing of the Public Citizen consumer advocacy group, stated that "Itlhe
Methanex action is an unconscionable corporate Canadian shakedown of California's
' 325
clean water standards."

This type of jurisdictional manipulation
may grant a dangerous privilege to industry
in public policy-making processes. 326 Foreign
investors could threaten damages awards
over host governments under Chapter 11 pretenses, which may affect crucial stages of the
public policy process involved in making environmental regulation. 327 There are millions

of constituents, either individuals or corporations, located within the boundaries of the
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321. Id.

Id.

322. Elias, supra note 292.

315. Id.

323. Elias, supra note 292.

314.

316. Dhooge, supra note 19, at 541.

324. Id.

317. Id.

325. id.

318. Id. at 544.

326. Dhooge. supra note 19, at 545.

319. Id. at 545.

327. Id.

106

Fall 2002

The Future of Environmental Regulation After Article 1110 of NAFTA

NAFTA countries. 328 The potential abuse of
Article 1110 may become overwhelming if
governments face lawsuits by any private individual adversely affected by governmental
regulation. Threats of suing for damages by
these private investors may significantly interfere with state sovereignty and environmental regulation, and the consequences of
this loss of governmental control over environmental matters may prove to be disastrous in the future.

against Canada for its ban on the gasoline

Furthermore, private corporations may
undermine environmental regulation by demanding compensation before they stop polluting. The investor-state provisions of
Chapter 11 essentially transfer ownership of
the environment to the polluters by requiring
the public to pay for the right to regulate the
environment. 329
Martin Wagner from
Earthjustice described the cases as "tantamount to extortion." 330 In Methanex, the corporation essentially claimed that the
government must pay Methanex in order to
stop it from producing a potentially dangerous chemical. 331 "This is even more appalling
when you consider that the victims of this extortion are the people of California who don't
want their drinking water contaminated by
332
MTBE," said Wagner.

tional ban on MTBE. 336 If the U.S. is forced to

Methanex is comparable to Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, the first case brought under
Chapter 11333 and another example of how
foreign corporations may influence domestic
environmental regulation. Ethyl Corporation,
a U.S. corporation, succeeded in forcing Canada to repeal its ban on MMT, a gasoline additive. 334 Ethyl Corporation brought suit

11, cannot. 338 Domestic investors do not

328. Id.
329. Dhooge, supra note 278, at 280.
330. Bottari, supra note 199.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Ethyl Corporation is a U.S. company that produces MMT, a fuel additive used in Canada to provide octane enhancement in unleaded gasoline. In 1997, Canada
passed the MMT Act, which prohibited the import and
trade of MMT into the country. Canada was not worried
about the health concern of MMT itself, but rather, with the
manganese oxides produced upon combustion of the additive. The Health Canada Report concluded that MMT, as

additive, and after the settlement process,
Canada had no other choice but to repeal the
ban and to continue to use a chemical that it
no longer wanted in its unleaded gasoline. 335
Applying this reasoning to Methanex, if
Methanex prevails in the Tribunal, it may succeed in forcing California to repeal its ban on
MTBE in order to lessen the damages award.
The U.S. Senate recently decided to triple the
ethanol used in gasoline and impose a napay a large award to Methanex, this may affect the national ban on MTBE, demonstrating one of the many dangers of Article I110 the influence foreign corporations may have
over environmental regulation.
V. The Provisions of Article 1 1 10 Give
Foreign Corporations an Unfair
Advantage Over Domestic
Corporations.

Chapter 11 of NAFTA creates an unfair
advantage for foreign investors over domestic
competitors. 337 Under Chapter 11, foreign

companies may take a number of measures
against the host government that domestic
companies, who are not protected by Chapter

have equivalent rights to foreign investors,
who may seek damages from a host state for
activities that adversely affect the foreign investors' interests. 339 Although a solution may
be to provide the same kind of compensation
to domestic investors, the result could be disastrous and could require the payment of
well as the oxides produced from its combustion, are not a
threat to the environment. Ethyl Corporation brought a
claim against Canada and a settlement for $13 million was
reached. The Canadian ban was eventually reversed. For
more information go to Statement of Claim, Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last
visited Oct. 15, 2002).
335. Id.
336. MTBE Plan Stirs Fears of Risk to State's Gas, S.F.
Mar. 9, 2002, at A3.
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hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation. 340 Instead, domestic investors may decide to go to other countries because they
receive greater protection for their investments under NAFTA than they would under
domestic laws.
For example, if Methanex were to prevail
in its claims, neither the U.S. government nor
California will be obligated to compensate
domestic manufacturers of methanol. 34 1 Domestic manufacturers of methanol such as
Terra Industries, Inc. ,342 will have no legal recourse for their loss of business from California. 343 The United States does not have an

expanded definition of "expropriation," and
its own takings doctrine compensates owners
only for their loss in land, not for their loss in
investments. Without alternatives for compensation, domestic companies must simply
absorb such losses. Thus, if Methanex were
to receive compensation for its losses due to
the MBTE ban, it gains an advantage over
U.S.based methanol-producing companies
such as Terra Industries, who are provided no
such remedy.
VI. Conclusion.
Although NAFTA was drafted and ratified
with the best intentions, Article 1110 provides private companies with a major loop-

340. Id. at 548.
341. Id.
342. Terra Industries is one of the leading U.S. producers and marketers of methanol. For more information,
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hole. Abuse of Article 1110 may have dire
consequences on the future of environmental
regulation for Mexico, Canada, and the
United States. Allowing private corporations
whose investments are negatively affected by
environmental laws to sue national governments may make countries more reluctant to
pass environmental laws. Foreign corporations are given an unfair advantage over domestic corporations because the foreign
corporations can seek compensation for takings while domestic corporations must absorb such losses. Finally, it appears that
NAFTA arbitration tribunals are expanding
the definition of expropriation. Broadened
too far, NAFTA's definition of expropriation
may be exploited by corporations and hinder
not only environmental regulation, but also
the stability of basic governmental functions
and national economic welfare.
The future of environmental regulation
will be greatly influenced by the arbitrations
filed under Article I 110. As more cases are
litigated, the parameters of Article 1110 will
be more clearly defined and its limits set.
Hopefully, a balance can be struck between
protecting investor rights in foreign countries
and the rights of governments to regulate the
environment and protect public health.

go to Terra Industries, available at http://www.terraindustries.
com (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
343. Dhooge, supra note 19, at 547-48.

